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Starting from the fundamental principles of transport pricing the paper discusses the 
relative merits of a number of policy measures. It is argued that in the short to 
medium run the discouragement of the purchase of new diesel cars is the most 
important environmental measure that can be taken. A further increase in the fuel 
efficiency is no priority. In the same time frame parking charges and a cordon toll 
around major cities have an important role to play, while subsidies to public transport 
are justified only if a number of conditions are met. A toll on trucks is mainly an 
interesting way to make transit traffic pay taxes, but could be less useful to control the 
congestion levels. In the long run prices should be based on marginal social costs. 
Such pricing measures should be accompanied by a well-directed use of the revenues 
to correct for the effects on the poorest income groups. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Transport pricing continuously receives a lot of attention in the political debate. The 
transport sector is one of the sectors in which government intervention is required 
because the normal functioning of the market creates negative side effects. However, 
in the general interest of society, one should refrain from pursuing policies that are  
counterproductive, ineffective and/or too expensive. The aim of this paper is to 
contribute to the scientific and  political debate by summarising recent research on 
transport pricing. 
 
Our paper first formulates the fundamental principles. Next, we discuss the pros and 
cons of a number of policy measures that can be taken either in the short to medium 
run or in the long run. For the short to medium run we consider the following 
measures: the taxation of cars in function of their environmental damage, parking 
charges, public transport fares, a cordon toll around cities and a kilometre charge on 
trucks. For the long run we argue for the introduction of a more sophisticated toll and 
discuss its effects on tax revenue and on the income distribution. We also analyse 
whether the toll revenues should be used for financing investments.  
                                                 
1 Published in journal  “Reflets et Perspectives de la vie economique”,2004,Vol XLIII,N°4, pp23-24   
2 Corresponding  author: Stef Proost, CES, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium, E-mail: 
Stef.Proost@econ.kuleuven.ac.be.   2
 
From the recent research projects we distil propositions for an improved transport 
pricing policy in Belgium. Propositions are concise statements that are valid only 
under certain conditions. In this text we mainly provide intuition for the propositions. 
The scientific underpinning can be found in the articles that we refer to. 
 
 
2.   Basic principles for sound transport pricing policies 
 
2.1.   The fundamental rule 
 
From an economic point of view it is not rational to consume a good or service if one 
is willing to pay less than the marginal social cost of providing that good or service. 
The reason is simple: when a consumer values a good or service less than its cost for 
society, it is better not to consume the good or service. This is the case for all goods 
and services, including transport. The argument holds for public and private transport, 










Applying this simple rule is not that straightforward. First of all, it requires policy 
makers to have a good idea of the extra costs caused by the transport activity. 
Economists use the term “marginal social costs” to refer to these extra costs to 
society. In the case of a car trip the marginal social costs consist of the following 
components (Table 1): the resource cost (or cost before taxes) of the car trip, the time 
and accident costs of the car user, the environmental costs, the accident costs caused 
to the other transport users and to society in general, and the extra time costs for the 
other road users. The resource cost of a car trip consists, among others, of the car 
costs, the fuel costs, the parking costs, the maintenance costs and the road damage 
costs.  
 




marginal benefit for the car user 
Marginal social cost 
- cost of car trip before taxes (car, fuel, 
maintenance, parking, …) 
- cost of car trip before taxes (car, fuel, 
maintenance, social cost of parking, road 
damage costs, …) 
- Own time costs  - Own time costs 
- Taxes (car, fuel,…) and charges  - Environmental costs 
- Own accident costs + insurance premia 
for accident costs caused to others 
- Own accident costs + extra accident 
costs caused to others 
  - Extra time costs caused to others   3
 
 
Whether the price that car users are willing to pay is at least as high as the marginal 
social costs of the car trip, depends on the price and tax structure. Car users pay part 
of the resource costs of their trips and bear their own time and accident costs. They 
also pay taxes and insurance premia for the accident costs caused to others.  
 
Therefore, one has to determine whether the car and fuel taxes, the other charges and 
the insurance premia are equal to the uncovered resource costs, the environmental 
costs and the time and accident costs caused to others. If this is not the case, the taxes 
and charges need to be reformed. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for the car transport 
market. To simplify things, the figure assumes that the car users completely pay for 
the resource costs. Moreover, insurance premia are not taken into consideration. The 
optimal demand for car transport (Xopt) corresponds with the intersection between the 
demand curve and the marginal social cost curve. In this point the price that car users 
are willing to pay equals the marginal social costs. The optimal tax that is indicated on 
the figure makes sure that this point is reached. Without this tax transport demand 
would equal Xno tax. At this level of transport demand the price that car users are 


















Xopt Xno tax  
 
 
This fundamental rule should be satisfied not only for an average car trip, but for each 
type of car trip: for clean and dirty cars, in the peak and the off-peak period, for 
careful and dangerous drivers, in urban and non urban areas. Furthermore, the rule 
should also be satisfied for the other transport modes.  
   4
It is important to note that the fundamental rule assigns the responsibility for the 
choice of the transport mode and the number of kilometres to the transport users, since 
they know best what is good for themselves. This is an important characteristic of the 
economic approach and distinguishes it from regulation. The role of the government is 
to make sure that the prices reflect the marginal social costs. The power and efficiency 
of this approach is often underestimated. Apparently, politicians mainly believe in the 
effect of price reductions, rather than price increases. Of course, price instruments are 
not the only measures that are worthwhile. Certainly in the case of transport safety, 
regulatory measures are often advisable.  
 
It is clear that with the current flat structure of transport prices the demand for 
transport is not rational in all circumstances. This is the reason why economists argue 
that there are inefficiencies: the prices are not equal to the marginal social costs, 
causing the demand for transport non-optimal. The next question that comes to mind 
is: how important is this problem? How large are the pricing inefficiencies?  
 
 
2.2.   How large are the pricing inefficiencies? 
 
The TRENEN-II STRAN project
3 is one of the projects that has examined current 
transport pricing practices in Europe. Figure 2 gives an idea of the pricing 
inefficiencies in Brussels in 2005 for different transport markets under a business-as- 
usual scenario.  
 
 





























































































resource cost time cost tax parking resource cost MEC
 
Car = small gasoline car, 1 occupant, resident of Brussels, no parking charge; PT = public transport 
(bus, tram, metro); MEC = marginal external costs; pkm = passenger kilometre 
Source:De Borger & Proost (2001) 
 
                                                 
3 The TRENEN-II STRAN project was financed by the fourth framework programme of the European 
Commission. The results are summarised in Proost et al. (2002). A more detailed discusssion of the 
methodology and the results is presented in De Borger & Proost (2001).   5
 
For car transport Figure 2 considers the case of a small gasoline car with one occupant 
who is a resident of Brussels and who does not pay a parking charge. For each 
transport mode the left column presents the generalised price (= money price + time 
cost) per passenger kilometre (pkm), while the right column presents the marginal 
social costs. During the peak period there is a large divergence between the 
generalised price and the marginal social costs, which indicates that peak transport 
demand is not rational. The situation is less dramatic during the off-peak period. It is 
important to note that also the demand for public transport is irrational since the 
public transport prices are lower than the marginal social costs. 
   6
 
 
Proposition 2:  
In the peak period the price of private car transport and public transport is too low 




Figures 3 and 4 present the situation for interregional transport in Belgium in 2005 
under a business-as-usual scenario. Figure 3 refers to passenger transport, while 
Figure 4 concerns freight transport. The information for road transport relates to 
highways. For each transport mode a comparison is made between the taxes per 
passenger or tonne kilometre (left column) and the marginal external costs (right 
column). Also in this case the differences are more pronounced during the peak 
period. In almost all cases the taxes are lower than the marginal external costs. The 
marginal external costs differ strongly between the transport modes. The variable 
costs of public transport are also subsidised. 
 
 
Figure 3:   Are the current prices correct? – Belgium 2005 – passenger  































































































Car = small diesel car, 1 occupant, highway; PT = train; MEC = marginal external cost; pkm = 
passenger kilometre 
Source: De Borger & Proost (2001) 
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- The figures for trucks relate to highways 
- MEC = marginal external costs; tkm = tonne kilometre 
Source: De Borger & Proost (2001) 
 
 
The TRENEN-II STRAN project presents a diagnosis, but also indicates how the 
current taxes should be changed in order to solve the problem. In the next section we  
discuss the form these price reform should ideally take, when the government can use 
perfect policy instruments. This case should mainly be considered as a benchmark 
with which the other policy options can be compared. Afterwards, we evaluate a 
number of concrete policies that can be pursued in the short and the long run.  
 
 
2.3.  The ideal case 
 
Table 2 gives an indication of the change in money prices and taxes that should 
ideally take place in Brussels and Belgium if the government could make use of 
perfect instruments
4. Since the results were obtained with a very aggregated model, 
the table only gives an indication. However, it does show that both for Brussels and 
for Belgium a strong increase in taxes is required for car and truck transport in the 
peak period. In the off-peak period taxes should also be raised, but less so. For public 
transport the existing subsidies per passenger km should be abolished and replaced by 
taxes
5. The table also present the effect of these measures on the marginal external 
costs. 
                                                 
4 The exercise for Brussels takes into account the existence of distortionary taxes in the rest of the 
economy, while the exercise for Belgium does not. Therefore, the results for the two case studies 
cannot be simply compared with each other.  




Marginal social cost pricing implies that in the peak period the taxes on car and 
truck transport should substantially be increased. In the off-peak period the taxes 
should also rise, but less so. For public transport the existing subsidies that are 




Table 2:   The change in prices, taxes and marginal external costs in Brussels 
    and Belgium with optimal policy 
 
Brussels Belgium 
Percentage change w.r.t. the 
reference equilibrium 









Car – peak  +219%  +499% -78% +159% +600%  -64%
Car – off-peak  +101%  +127% 0% +7% +25%  -3%
PT peak  +33%  +105% -78% +135% -103%
a 0%
PT off-peak  +213%  -169%
a +14% +24% -138%
a 0%
Freight transport 
Road peak    +98% +644%  -62%
Road off-peak    +7% +44%  0%
Rail   +15% -200%
a 0%
Inland navigation    0% 0%  33%
- For Brussels: Car = small gasoline car, resident of Brussels, no parking charge in the reference 
equilibrium 
- For Belgium: Car = small diesel car 
- The results for road transport in Belgium refer to highways 
a These cases correspond with the replacement of subsidies by taxes 
Source: De Borger & Proost (2001) 
 
 
Applying these theoretical recommendations in practice is not easy. First of all, one 
needs to determine the level of the marginal external costs. Measuring the marginal 
external costs can involve error margins, but is possible in principle
6. Even an 
imprecise estimate of the marginal external costs can form an important basis for 
improving current policies. It does not only teach use that the price of urban car 
transport is substantially too low during the peak period, but also that diesel cars cause 
more environmental damage than gasoline cars and that urban buses in the off-peak 
period cause high marginal costs in the form of air pollution and noise.  
 
                                                 
6 The UNITE project (fifth framework programme – Transport RTD programme of the European 
Commission) has made a survey of the existing estimates of the marginal external costs and has 
developed further the methodology for determining the marginal external costs. 
(www.its.leeds.ac.uk/projects/unite/index.html)   9
Secondly, the right policy instrument needs to be chosen to correct for the 
inefficiencies. For example, the taxes on the purchase and ownership of cars can   
easily be differentiated according to the environmental characteristics of the vehicles. 
However, it is more difficult to differentiate taxes in function of time and place of  
travel. Fuel taxes do not allow for this, and therefore are not an appropriate instrument 
to correct for congestion. More sophisticated instruments are required which cannot 
be implemented easily in the short run. However, this does not mean that nothing can 
be done in the short run. In the next sections we evaluate the performance of a number 
of measures that can be implemented in the short to medium run. Afterwards, we 
present instruments that are more suited for the longer run.  
 
 
3.   Short to medium term measures 
 
We consider five policy measures that can be implemented in the relatively short run. 
The implementation of the first three measures is very simple. It concerns:  
•  a correct taxation of gasoline and diesel cars; 
•  better parking charges; 
•  a change in public transport fares. 
In addition, we consider two measures of which the implementation is more 
complicated, but that can also be taken in the medium run, as is evident from existing 
and planned schedules in a number of European countries
7. They consist of: 
•  the introduction of a cordon toll around major cities; 
•  the introduction of a kilometre charge on trucks. 
 
 
3.1.   A correct taxation of gasoline and diesel cars 
 
In Belgium in 2002 the share of diesel cars in the car stock was 43.4%. In the same 
year more than 64% of the newly registered cars was a diesel car. EU trends are 
similar. It is expected that the share of diesel cars will increase even further in the 
future. However, diesel cars are more polluting than gasoline cars. They also raise less 
revenue than gasoline cars (because diesel cars are more fuel efficient). This situation 
has partly arisen because the tax authorities did not take into account the technological 
developments for diesel cars and new scientific analyses that point to the 






The discouragement of the purchase of new diesel cars is the most important 
environmental measure that can be taken now in the transport sector. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Another measure that should clearly be considered is the tax treatment of company cars. This is less 
straightforward than it seems at first when company cars are seen as part of the wage and when it is 
recognised that a tax exemption for company cars influences the effective employment rate. This is 
analysed in ongoing research by De Borger & Proost.    10
 
The taxation of diesel and gasoline cars is constrained by a number of factors. First of 
all, in the short run it is difficult to tax car use directly, so that one has to tax the 
inputs of car use instead. Therefore, one has to resort to taxes on the purchase or 
ownership of cars and to fuel taxes. Of these two types of instruments the fuel taxes 
are probably the most appropriate to correct for the external costs, but they also have a 
number of disadvantages. As was mentioned before, fuel taxes cannot be 
differentiated according to the time and location of travel, nor can they be made 
dependent on the emission technology of the vehicle. Fuel taxes will also lead to 
vehicles which are too fuel efficient from a social point of view. Fixed taxes have the 
advantage that they can be made dependent on the emission characteristics of the 
vehicles. 
 
Secondly, it is difficult for the government to observe the purpose for which cars and  
car fuel are used. Diesel is used both by cars and trucks. This points to an important 
role for fixed taxes that can be differentiated between cars and trucks, whereas it is 
less easy to realise this for fuel taxes. However, it is also difficult to make a 
distinction between car ownership and use for private and business purposes. This 
puts constraints on the contribution of taxes on car ownership and car use to the 
revenue raising objective. 
 
Finally, the role of fuel taxes is complicated by the possibility of fuel tourism. In a 
small country with a lot of transit traffic, such as Belgium,  policy makers may be 
tempted to set the fuel tax somewhat lower than in neighbouring countries in order to 
generate extra income. Higher fuel taxes are also less attractive because Belgian 
residents and companies can buy their fuel abroad. 
 
If, because of these reasons, one does not wish to change the current fuel taxes, the 
large share of diesel cars can be corrected by raising the tax on the purchase and 










The current excises mainly intend to raise revenue, to limit the volume of peak 
transport and to limit the emission of traditional pollutants. Vehicles that consume less 
fuel contribute to the achievement of the Kyoto objective for CO2 emissions, but do so 
at a cost that is much higher than the cost of emission reduction in the rest of the 
economy. A litre of diesel that is used by cars costs approximately 0.7 euro, while a 
litre of diesel that is used in the residential sector costs 0.25 euro. Both types of diesel 
emit the same amount of carbon. However, it is cheaper to save energy in the 
residential sector. Indeed, each sector only has an interest in investing in more 
efficient technologies as long as the cost of these technologies per litre of fuel saved is 
smaller than or equal to the price of a litre of fuel. The existing fuel prices imply that 
                                                 
8 see: Mayeres & Proost (2001a), De Borger & Mayeres (2004)   11
up to now the potential saving in energy costs were much higher in the transport 
sector than elsewhere, and that the transport sector has already gone much further in 
energy saving than other sectors. Hence, it will cost much more than in other sectors 
to reduce the energy use even further in the transport sector. A further decrease in the 
fuel consumption per kilometre by cars therefore is not a priority for policy (Proost & 
Van Dender, 2001).  
 
 
3.2.   Parking charges  
 
Parking charges can make an important contribution to solving urban transport 
problems. One of the causes of urban transport problems is that not all car users have 
to pay for parking at their destination, either because their employer or shop offers 
them free parking, or because they can park their car for free on the road. Because the 
resource costs of these parking spaces obviously is not equal to zero, an inefficiency 
arises. Exercises with the TRENEN model for Brussels show that one can obtain 30% 
of the welfare gain of the optimal policy by letting everyone pay the resource cost of 
parking (see Table 3). As regards the on-street parking fares, the parking fares of 
private parking lots are a good indication (Calthrop & Proost, 2004). However, the 
parking charges cannot be differentiated sufficiently between the peak and the off-
peak period, which explains why one can obtain only 30% of the maximal welfare 
gain. It should be noted that the performance of the measure can be expected to 





Parking measures have an important role to play in transport policy in the short run. 
The parking charges of private parking lots are a good indication for the on-street 




Levying higher parking charges should be accompanied by good enforcement 
policies. Table 3 does not yet take into account the enforcement costs. Since the 
revenues from parking charges in principle benefit local government, it has an 
incentive to ensure a good enforcement policy.  
 
 
Table 3:   The relative efficiency of a selection of policy instruments –  
  Brussels  2005 
 
Policy instrument  Relative efficiency w.r.t. optimal policy 
Current situation  0% 
Better public transport fares  5-10% 
Better parking charges  30% 
Cordon toll  52% 
Optimal policy  100% 
Source: Proost & Van Dender (2001) 
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3.3.   Public transport fares 
 
Higher subsidies to public transport are often considered as an alternative measure if, 
for one reason or another, the price of private transport cannot be set equal to 
marginal social costs. However, the desirability of higher public transport subsidies 
depends on a number of crucial conditions. Before going into these conditions, we 
first discuss the subsidies and the marginal social costs we focus on. We do this for 
the case of rail transport.  
 
We do not consider the subsidies that are meant to cover the fixed costs of providing 
the tracks (approximately 50% to 60% of total railway costs). We only consider those 
subsidies that allow to sell public transport services at a price below the marginal cost. 
As in the case of road transport, there are large differences in the marginal cost of a 
public transport service in the peak and the off-peak period. For example, the 
marginal cost of a rail trip between Leuven and Brussels in second class could be 6 
euro (the price of a first class ticket) while the marginal cost in the off-peak period 





Public transport fares should be differentiated according to time and location of 
travel. Subsidising public transport during the peak period is justified only if a 




Subsidising public transport during the peak period is justified only if the following 
conditions are met:  
•  First of all, it must be impossible to charge a correct price to private transport. 
If it is possible to increase the price of private transport, it becomes less 
attractive to maintain or increase the public transport subsidies. This is the 
reason why in the long run both the prices of private and public transport need 
to be increased in the peak period (see Table 2).  
•  Secondly, it only makes sense to make public transport cheaper, if this 
encourages a sufficiently large number of people to switch from car transport 
to public transport on those links and those times of travel where there is a lot 
of congestion. Subsidies are mainly justified on links in the direction of the big 
cities and during the peak period and only to the extent that car users switch 
from car use to public transport. 
•  Thirdly, the own price elasticity of public transport should be limited, 
otherwise it becomes a very expensive measure.  
•  Fourthly, the subsidy should be differentiated according to trip motive, where 
the commuting motive should be associated with lower prices since this 









3.4.   A cordon toll around major cities 
 
Several cities consider the introduction of a cordon toll. In Belgium this could be 
worthwhile for Brussels and Antwerp. With a simple aggregated model we have 
analysed the efficiency of a cordon toll for Brussels, where the toll depends on the 
time at which one travels. We found that a cordon toll around Brussels leads to a 
positive result, but that it is less efficient than more sophisticated forms of road 
pricing. The reason is than a cordon toll mainly limits inbound traffic and that traffic 
that remains inside the cordon partly increases when inbound traffic falls. In Table 3 
we therefore see a relative efficiency of 52% of the cordon toll in comparison with the 
optimal policy. The cordon toll therefore needs to be complemented by other 





A time-dependent cordon toll around major cities, contributes to a reduction in 





The implementation of a cordon toll will imply conflicts of interest between different 
regions (Brussels) or between the city (Antwerp) and the region. With the same 
simple model we have illustrated
9 the efficiency loss that would arise when a local 
government only sets its transport policy for the benefit of its own citizens. We 
considered the case where the city of Brussels can set the parking charges and keep 
the revenues from these charges, whereas the federal government can determine the 
level of a cordon toll around Brussels. In this setting the Brussels government will 
raise as much revenue as possible from parking charges since this is a way of taxing 
non-residents. The federal government will then charge a relatively low cordon toll 
since transport demand is already reduced by the high parking charges in Brussels. A 
surprising result of this game with conflicting interests is that the final outcome is not 
that inefficient. It results in a shift of taxation to the commuters, but from a transport 
economic point of view the result is 90% as efficient as when one government level  





The distribution of pricing competences between the regions and the federal 
government does not necessarily lead to large inefficiencies. 
 
 
                                                 
9 See De Palma et al. (2003)   14
 
Of course, other coordination problems can arise between the regions and the cities 
which could lead to larger efficiency losses. Therefore, consultation is important.  
 
 
3.5.   A kilometre charge on trucks 
 
Belgium could have an interest in introducing a kilometre charge on trucks since it is 
a transit country. Many foreign trucks drive through Belgium. They do not pay fuel 
taxes in Belgium, but cause costs: they increase congestion and accident risks, they 
contribute to air pollution and cause road damage.  
 
The existing Eurovignette directive, that needs replacement, only applies to highways. 
The directive only covers infrastructure costs and not the external costs. The price of 
the Eurovignette does not depend on the number of kilometres that is driven. In 
Belgium its price is however related to the number of axles and the environmental 
characteristics of the vehicle.  
 
Some European countries have already introduced a toll on truck transport that is 
related to the number of kilometres driven, besides other characteristics of the vehicle 
(e.g., Switzerland has introduced a toll on the complete network and Austria charges a 
toll on highways and expressways), or is thinking of introducing such a toll (e.g., 
Germany and the United Kingdom). The European Union is developing a new 
legislative framework for this (proposal for revision of the Eurovignette directive) and 
has to ensure that the technological side develops in a coordinated way (EU proposal 
of directive of April 2003).  
 
In principle each country can determine the toll level itself. For the time being the toll 
must still be based on the infrastructure costs of the lasts years, but in the future the 
toll can also be differentiated spatially and in time. In Belgium the implementation in 
the regions must be coordinated by the federal government. 
 
The new European proposal says that the toll revenues need to be used within the 
transport sector. From an economic point of view this is not the best option. It is 
preferable that the revenues are added to the other tax incomes and that the money is 
used where it can achieve the highest benefits. This is not necessarily in the transport 
sector.  
 
Taxing freight transport only is a partial solution if the price of passenger transport is 
not changed. However, an exercise for the United Kingdom
10 shows that a tax on 
freight transport can increase welfare under certain conditions, even if the taxes on 
passenger transport remain substantially too low. The study also provides a better 
insight in the characteristics of a tax on freight transport:  
•  The higher the indirect cross-price effects of the tax on freight transport on 
passenger transport (via the price of the transported commodities and the level 
of congestion), the lower the optimal level of the tax on freight transport. If a 
                                                 
10 see Calthrop et al. (2003). The study examines a more general tax than the one that is proposed by 
the EU. More specifically, it takes into account all external effects. Furthermore, the study assumes that 
the tax income is used to reduce labour taxes.   15
higher tax on freight transport substantially increases passenger transport, this 
aggravates the problems on the market for passenger transport.  
•  The benefit of a given tax on freight transport increases as the tax on 
passenger transport is higher. This reflects the fact that the existing taxes on 
passenger transport are not yet correct.  
•  The higher the tax on passenger transport, the lower the optimal tax on freight 
transport. A higher tax on passenger transport leads to lower marginal external 
costs of freight transport and therefore to a lower tax on freight transport. This 
result has important policy implications, if one wants to introduce road pricing 
piecewise, first for freight transport and next for both freight and passenger 
transport. 
 
This means that the toll on freight transport can be interesting when it generates extra 
income from transit traffic and when the revenue is well spent, for example to reduce 
the social security taxes. But, one shouldn’t expect too much from the toll of trucks in 
terms of congestion reduction because latent car demand will take part of the freed 





A toll on trucks mainly is an interesting way of making transit traffic pay taxes. It 




Continuing our reasoning, we must also question the subsidies for inland navigation 
and railways that are intended to mitigate the congestion problem by luring freight 
transport off the road. When the freed road space is taken by additional cars, the 
subsidies are not a very efficient way of reducing congestion and the total cost-benefit 




As long as road traffic does not pay the correct price, infrastructure measures for 




4.   Longer term solutions 
 
In the longer run more sophisticated solutions are possible than in the short run. New 
technological developments offer the possibility of introducing an electronic toll, 
where the toll can be differentiated in function of the time of travel and the road type. 
This allows to charge a price that corresponds more closely to the marginal social 
costs. In the next paragraphs we briefly discuss the possibilities of such a system. We 
also go into the impact on government revenue and the use of these revenues. We 
stress the link between the use of the revenues and the effects on the different income 
groups. Finally, we discuss the link between pricing and investment policy.  
   16
 
4.1.   Marginal social cost pricing and the impacts on government revenue 
 
Table 4 summarises some effects of marginal social cost pricing for five countries. 
The results are based on an ECMT study with the TRENEN model. In all cases 
considered marginal social cost pricing leads to a welfare gain. There also is a 
substantial increase in transport tax revenues.  
 
   17




France Germany  The 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Welfare gain       
(10
9 euro/year) 
17 10  6  2  1 
Tax revenue  +65%  +56%  +64%  +31%  -20% 
Air pollution costs  -54%  -50%  -35%  -31%  -42% 
Congestion 
(change in speed 
in the peak period)
+10% +9% +13% +12%  - 
Source: ECMT 2003 
 
These studies show that – on average, for all modes taken together and for a given 
capacity – marginal social cost pricing will lead to financial surpluses in the transport 
sector, certainly in urban areas. If one considers the different modes separately, then 
for some modes surpluses are generated (road, certainly in urban areas). For the other 




On average, for all modes together and for a given capacity, marginal social cost 





One can wonder to what extent one should strive for a financial balance for all modes. 
This is a recurring question of the car lobby. A study
11 has compared marginal social 
cost pricing with other options that guarantee a break-even for all modes separately. 
To obtain such a break-even one can choose between several options: 
•  charging the average financial cost to each mode. 
•  charging Ramsey prices based on the marginal social costs with a possibility 
of a mark-up over marginal social costs. 
•  A two-part tariff, that consists of a fixed component and a variable component 
that depends on the use. This last option will not be elaborated upon further in 
this paper, although it can be useful
12. 
 
Table 5 compares the welfare gain that can be realised with marginal social cost 
pricing (with budget constraints) to the welfare effects for the two other pricing 
scenarios that guarantee a break-even situation. The table presents results for a 
number of areas in Germany and the United Kingdom.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Proost & Van Dender (2004) 
12 see, for example, De Borger (2001)   18
Table 5:   Welfare effects of alternative pricing scenarios (2005)    
  (percentage  change  in  generalised income w.r.t. the reference  
  equilibrium) 
 
 Price  =  average 
financial cost 
Price = Ramsey 
price, based on 
marginal social cost 
Price = marginal 
social cost 
Germany     
Düsseldorf -0,8%  +0,1%  +0,1% 
München -0,6%  +0,1%  +0,4% 
Münster -2,5%  -2,2%  +2,5% 
Westphalen -0,2% -0,1% +0,1% 
UK     
London -0,8%  +1,3%  +2,7% 
Southeast Region  -1,9%  +0,2%  +0,6% 





Imposing a budget constraint for the transport sector as a whole or for the transport 
modes separately reduces the efficiency gains that can be obtained by means of   
pricing reforms. Furthermore, the way in which the budget constraint is met has 




In all cases considered charging the average financial costs leads to a welfare loss. 
The reasons for this are as follows:  
•  If car use is too cheap from a social point of view and this cannot be corrected 
because of a break-even constraint for the road sector, there is a role for public 
transport subsidies. However, this is not possible if there is a budget constraint 
for each transport mode separately. The taxes on each mode then are 
determined to a large extent by the budget constraint for that mode and not by 
the prices of the substitute transport modes.  
•  The revenues of the current transport taxes are higher than what is required by 
the budget constraints for the transport sector as a whole. Optimal tax theory 
shows that, if transport demand is relatively price inelastic, it costs relatively 
little to raise revenue in that sector. The fact that extra tax revenue is currently 
raised in the transport sector can then be justified.  
 
Ramsey pricing leads to better results than average financial cost pricing. The system 
also imposes a budget constraint, but allows for a larger differentiation of prices. With 
Ramsey prices one can obtain 30% to 90% of the welfare gain with marginal social 
cost pricing. 
 
In all cases marginal social cost pricing performs better. This indicates that the 
revenues that are obtained in this scenario are an important component of its welfare 
effect.  
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However, it should be noted that the importance of budget constraints should not be 
downplayed. In certain circumstances they can also be useful. They can for example 
give an important signal to transport operators to produce efficiently.  
 
 





A given infrastructure (roads, railways, canals, harbours) is always used most 




If the capacity of the infrastructure is very large, then the best price for the use of the 
infrastructure will equal the marginal operating costs (in the absence of   
environmental or accident costs). However, if infrastructure capacity is too low, a 
price needs to be charged such that demand equals the available capacity. Only this 
way one can ensure that the people who use the infrastructure are those that need it 
the most. This principle is valid independent of the infrastructure policy that was 
pursued in the past. It is therefore also worthwhile to improve transport pricing even if 
the infrastructure capacity is not optimal. Note that a similar principle also holds for 
private companies that charge a price dependent upon what consumers can bear and 
where sunk costs are as irrelevant as in the determination of optimal transport prices 
by the government.  
 
Of course it is advisable that a good investment policy is pursued, but it is not the case 
an incorrect investment policy would lead to different pricing rules. The pricing rules 
do not change, even though the price level depends on the available capacity. The 
prices should be reduced when capacity is expanded. 
 
A study by CE (2002) compares for an urban area the equilibrium with optimal prices 
and unchanged infrastructure with the equilibrium with optimal prices and optimal 
investments. The study shows that the prices are not much lower in the second case. 
Moreover, the total surplus does not differ a lot between the two cases. This is 
because the expansion of the infrastructure capacity in an urban area is expensive. 
 
Very often it is also argued that one should first increase the capacity of public 
transport before changing the prices of private transport. This is not necessarily true. 
In general correct pricing implies much higher prices of road transport in the peak in 
urban areas and may imply lower prices in more rural areas. For public transport the 
efficient prices may also increase substantially at certain moments and locations. The 
net effect on the demand for public transport is unclear and it is not necessarily the 
case that the capacity of public transport should increase by a lot. This question 
requires additional research with a network model.  
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4.3.   Transport pricing reforms and income distribution 
 
In order to know the distributive effects of transport pricing reforms, one needs to 
analyse who gains and who loses. This depends not only on the transport pricing 
policies but also – and especially – on the way in which one uses the extra revenues 




This means among other things that higher public transport subsidies are not 
necessarily an efficient way to favour poorer people. Indeed, these subsidies need to 
be financed. A study for Belgium
14 shows that higher public transport subsidies 
reduce welfare of the lower income groups if they are financed by lower social 
security transfers. But if they are financed by higher labour taxes they entail a 
redistribution from the richer to the poorer income groups.  
 
Marginal social cost pricing is often attacked for being an asocial measure. Table 6 
gives the effects on five different income groups of two pricing measures: average 
cost and marginal social cost pricing. 
 
 
Table 6:   The effects of transport pricing reforms on five income groups  
  (Belgium  1990) 
 
 Price  =  average 
financial cost 
 









revenues used to  
reduce the 
labour tax 








Percentage increase in equivalent income 
Quintile 1 (poorest quintile)  -0,78%  +0,47%  +3,88% 
Quintile 2  -0,04%  +0,03%  +2,21% 
Quintile 3  -0,24%  -0,16%  +0,75% 
Quintile 4  -0,20%  +0,22%  +0.00% 
Quintile 5 (richest quintile)  -0,49%  +1,45%  -0,51% 
Increase in social welfare (euro/person) 
- Only efficiency matters 








a The weight given to richer quintiles is smaller than that given to the poorer quintiles (for example the 
weight assigned to individuals in quintile 5 is 70% of the weight given to individuals in quintile 1) 
Source: Mayeres et al. (2003) 
 
 
In Table 6 the welfare effect of each policy reform is presented by means of the 
percentage change in equivalent income. In the last two rows of the table the total 
welfare effect is given for two cases. In the first case only economic efficiency 
                                                 
13 see Mayeres & Proost (2001b, 2003, 2004) 
14 Mayeres (2001)   21
matters. this means that the total welfare effect is obtained by summing the welfare 
effects for the individuals in the five income groups. In the second case equity 
considerations play a role and a weighted sum is made of the welfare effects for the 
different income groups. A higher weight is assigned to the lower income groups.  
 
When the government pursues a policy that aims to cover the financial costs per 
mode, the price is set equal to the average financial cost. This entails an increase in 
the public transport fares and lower taxes on road transport. The total tax revenues 
from the transport sector fall, which necessitates an increase in the labour tax. In the 
end everyone looses in this scenario because the transport prices are even less related 
to the marginal social costs than in the reference situation and because higher taxes 
need to be imposed on labour. The five income groups are affected differently by this 
policy reform. For example, the poorest income group mainly suffers from the 
increase in public transport prices, while the richest income group mainly suffers from 
the increase in the labour tax.  
 
Table 6 also considers two scenarios with marginal social cost pricing. They lead to 
extra government revenue. The final effect of marginal social cost pricing therefore 
depends on the use of this extra revenue. The table presents two possibilities. In the 
first case the extra revenues are used to reduced the tax on labour by 10%. In the 
second case the extra revenues are used to increase the social security transfers
15 by 
11%. In both cases the welfare effect is positive for most income groups. If only 
efficiency matters, the total welfare gain for the economy is the largest when the 
labour taxes are reduced. However, the income distribution is better when the social 
security transfers are increased, which explains why this option performs best when 
equity considerations play a role. These distributional effects can be controlled better 






An equitable income distribution is served best by a correct pricing in the transport 
sector combined with a well-directed use of the revenues to correct for the effects on 
the poorest income groups. 
 
 
                                                 
15 It concerns social security transfers that do not have a direct impact on labour supply, e.g. child 
allowances etc.    22
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